Ross Douthat interviews Ryan Burge, an ordained minister and data analyst who recently closed his own church after 17 years of pastoring. Burge is author of The Vanishing Church How the Hollowing Out of Moderate Congregations is Hurting Democracy, Faith, and Us, examining American religious trends through demographic data.

The conversation explores the plateau in American secularization after decades of decline, analyzing why religious disaffiliation stopped growing around 2020. They examine changing patterns in gender, class, and political affiliation within American Christianity.

Burge discusses the collapse of mainline Protestantism, the rise of non-denominational churches, and how political polarization shapes religious identity. The interview covers speculation about future religious trends, from traditionalist Catholicism to potential Amish demographic growth.

The Great Plateau: Why American Secularization Stalled

The 'nones' (no religious affiliation) represent atheists, agnostics, and 'nothing in particular' - growing from 5% in 1972 to 30% today, making it 'the biggest social movement happening in America over the last 30 years that we just don't talk about that much.'

Around 2020-2021, rapid secularization from 1991-2020 hit a plateau, with Christians stabilizing at 63-65% of Americans: 'This is a plateau, not a reversal. This is not a revival' - Ryan.

Burge theorizes America has a 'bedrock of religiosity' unlike other Western countries, with loose affiliates becoming honest about non-belief once Cold War stigma against atheism disappeared.

Church attendance (behavior) declines fastest, followed by religious belonging, then belief: 'Never attending people are actually more likely to say God exists without any doubts than they are to say God doesn't exist at all' - Ryan.

Gender Reversal: Men Staying, Women Leaving

Historically, women have been more religious than men across most Christian countries, though 'we don't really know why' - Ryan.

Among Gen Z, women are leaving church 'at an incredibly rapid rate' while men leave at slower rates, creating similar religiosity levels between genders for the first time.

Burge's church closed with 75% female attendance, reflecting broader trends: 'I think that balance might sort of get closer to evening out over time.'

Stories of male converts to Eastern Orthodoxy represent statistical outliers: 'There's less than a million people going to Orthodox church in America of a country of 330 million people' - Ryan.

Class Surprise: Elite Religion, Working-Class Secularization

Contrary to popular belief, 'educated people are actually more likely to go to church than less educated people are' with the ideal combination being bachelor's degrees and $60-100k income - Ryan.

Suburban evangelical megachurches primarily serve 'white, upper-middle-class, educated folks' rather than working-class populations as commonly assumed.

The 'nothing in particular' group shows lowest educational attainment with only 25% having four-year degrees: 'They're dropping out of education, they're dropping out of religion, and they're dropping out of politics' - Ryan.

Religion increasingly correlates with social engagement: 'What leads you to success in life leads you to church' - the 'golden path' of educated, middle-class, married with children.

Mainline Collapse: The End of Moderate Christianity

Burge pastored First Baptist Church from 2006-2024, watching attendance drop from 50 to 10-12 people before closing after 156 years: 'I've been a part of three churches and two of them don't exist anymore' - Ryan.

Mainline Protestantism declined from over 50% of Americans in 1958 to 8% today, with average age around 60 years old.

J.P. Demirath's 1995 theory suggests mainline declined because it succeeded too well: Americans adopted mainline values of pluralism and individual freedom, eliminating the church's distinctive appeal.

Political neutrality hurt mainline churches as 'people want to go to a place that's coded left or right' while mainline 'resisted all that' - Ryan.

Political Tribalism: How Polarization Reshapes Faith

Political ideology became the top predictor of religiosity: 'If you're a liberal, 50-50 chance you're a non-religious person. If you're a conservative, it's about a 12% chance' - Ryan.

White Christianity became coded as Republican, unlike the 1980s when evangelicals and mainline Protestants showed similar political distributions.

Most evangelical pastors avoid explicit political endorsements from pulpits, but politics emerges 'bottom-up' from 'the pews, Bible study, parking lots and hallways' - Ryan.

Burge advocates for 'aggressively apolitical' approaches, citing Catholic 'consistent ethic of life' as a model for holistic rather than partisan religious messaging.

Future Christianity: Non-Denominational Dominance

Non-denominational Christianity grew from 3% in 1972 to 15% today, becoming the second-biggest religious story after the rise of nones.

Only the Assemblies of God (Pentecostal) shows consistent growth among traditional Protestant denominations, while 'every other denomination is significantly smaller today than 20 or 30 years ago' - Ryan.

Non-denominational churches are 'anti-institution' and 'anti-authority' with money staying 'right here in these four walls' rather than supporting broader denominational structures.

Future Protestant Christianity will be 'very fragmented' with 'little fiefdoms' of 15,000-20,000 member churches, making evangelicalism harder to define and measure.

Wild Cards: Amish Growth and Traditionalist Movements

Demographic projections suggest Amish could represent 15% of Indiana and Pennsylvania by 2075, though Burge doubts exponential growth: 'As a religious tradition gets bigger, it's harder to maintain its cohesion.'

Traditionalist Catholicism ('trad cath') rejecting Vatican II represents a 'really interesting' trend, though unlikely to become majority Catholic practice.

Small growing denominations like Anglican Church North America (125,000 members) and Presbyterian Church in America show 'sustained growth' by combining 'best versions of evangelicalism with best versions of mainline.'

Despite internet disruption, in-person worship remains preferred: 'Two-thirds prefer attending in person and 15% prefer online' even among young people - Ryan.